Former minister of migration and asylum and New Democracy MP Dimitris Kairidis discusses Greek foreign policy and international relations in an exclusive interview with TO BHMA International edition
Few parliamentarians are as well-versed in Greek foreign policy and international relations than New Democracy MP Dimitris Kairidis, a professor of International Affairs, European and Regional Studies at Athens’ Panteion University.
A former minister of migration and asylum, he serves as the vice-chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Defence and Foreign Affairs and heads the Greek delegation to NATO’s Parliamentary Assembly.
In a wide-ranging exclusive interview with TO BHMA International edition, he assesses the course of ongoing Greek-Turkish talks and the delimitation of the two countries’ Exclusive Economic Zones, Greece’s continuing dedication to aiding Ukraine, and US President Donald Trump’s tariffs and stance toward the European Union, which he says highlights at long last the pressing need for “Europe’s emancipation and geostrategic autonomy”.
Greece insists that the only Greek-Turkish issues to be resolved are the delimitations of the two countries’ continental shelves and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). But Turkey has a list of disputes from demilitarisation of the Greek Aegean islands to Athens’ sovereignty over 100 plus Aegean islets. Is it really possible that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in his six meetings with the PM raised only those two issues?
President Erdogan is free to raise whatever he wants and likes, and Prime Minister Mitsotakis is equally free not to engage on any of these non-issues. I understand the implication, but this should not lead us to avoid contact. It would have been a gift to Turkey in its diplomatic effort if Greece were to appear intransigent internationally. On top of that, Greece’s arguments are so strong legally that we should not be afraid to make our case everywhere and always.
In July, 2023, PM Kyriakos Mitsotakis said that he is willing to discuss a daring approach with Turkey, and that an agreement on the delimitation of the EEZs and the continental shelves may involve compromises. Could that include Greece conceding that under international law the extent of a country’s airspace (Greece declares it has 10 miles) must coincide with that of its territorial waters (Greece currently has six nautical miles)?
The delimitation, according to international law, cannot be a unilateral act. It has to be agreed upon with the neighbouring country or adjudicated by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Therefore, the negotiation for delimitation is provided for in international law. It is exactly what we did with [our EEZs] with Italy and Egypt. In those cases, there were a few give-and-takes, as there usually are. It was exactly the fear of these give-and-takes that caused us to delay the EEZ delimitation with Italy for 40 years, even though we have excellent relations and no dispute whatsoever, and had already signed a delimitation of our continental shelves back in 1977.
It is that fear of the political class and the overall political climate which has often made Greece miss opportunities, like the one with Libya under Gaddafi, which we later came to regret. Obviously, one needs to be bold and forward-thinking if there is to be an agreement with Turkey, which has eluded us for 50 years. Had it been easy, we would have done it long ago.
Regarding the difference between airspace and territorial waters, the Greek argument is that as long as Greece can extend its territorial waters unilaterally to 12 nautical miles, according to international law, it is OK to have that difference in the spaces. Obviously, Turkey tries to use this to its advantage and makes a lot out of it.
In 2003, then PM Costas Simitis came close to a compromis on a Greek-Turkish petition to the International Court of Justice to resolve mutually agreed upon issues. Mr. Mitsotakis has said that in his talks with Mr. Erdogan, we have not yet reached the point of discussing that. Why is that?
A lot can be said about Erdogan’s first few years in power, when he showed some willingness to veer away from the traditional Kemalist nationalist line. This was manifested glaringly with Erdogan’s support for the Annan Plan and his ditching of [the historic leader of the Turkish Cypriot community Rauf] Denktash. Some would say that it was a missed opportunity, and that Greece did not fully exploit that window of opportunity, which later obviously closed and was turned on its head in 2012, with the domestic authoritarian shift of Erdogan and an aggressively revisionist policy abroad.
In its effort to aid Ukraine’s defence against Russian aggression, Athens transferred heavy military artillery from the Aegean islands to Kyiv. Has that weaponry been replaced? If not, it has been argued that it represents a partial demilitarisation of the islands, in a step towards satisfying Ankara’s longstanding demand.
There is a lot of Russian propaganda on that issue and many others. The deal was for Greece to replace old and antiquated equipment with modern, new American arms. We are in the process of implementing that deal. Having just visited Kyiv on the occasion of the third anniversary of the Russian invasion, I can say that Greece took a principled position, to condemn Russian aggression, despite its long-term historical relationship with the Russian people. However, we did it also because it was in our interest, because we don’t want aggressors to be rewarded, given the fact that we are faced with one in our part of the world [Turkey and its occupation of Cyprus]. Now, we need to back up words and declarations with deeds. Otherwise, we might be accused of acting like Hungarian PM Viktor Orban and Slovakia’s PM Robert Fico. It is not in Greece’s national interests to be placed in that category.
Greece has an expansive Military and Defence Cooperation Agreement (MDCA) with the US, but Turkey with its role in Syria and its ties with both Ukraine and Russia is now at the forefront. Given Mr. Trump’s friendship and elective affinities with Erdogan, do you think he will go along with a he will go along with a Syria-Turkey EEZ delimitation agreement that will harm the sovereign rights of Greece and Cyprus?
There is no doubt that Erdogan feels a bit vindicated, due to both the demise of Assad in Syria and the election of Trump in the US. I strongly believe, however, that it is premature to make any definitive statements about where things are going. Obviously, it is a continuous struggle and it has a lot to do with what happens in Ukraine, with the European security architecture, with Greek-American relations, with Israel’s policy and so on.
However, there is no doubt that we are in a new age, in which old certainties no longer hold, and that Greece’s strategies need to be innovative, forward-looking, and bolder. For this to come about, we politicians and opinion leaders have a lot of work to do in engaging and informing Greek society as regards the risks and opportunities of this new age.
Mr. Trump has said he is not fond of how the EU works but that he can work better bilaterally with member-states of his choosing. Is the EU-US partnership as we knew it over?
I will be frank. Some of Trump’s latest statements have come as a big shock to most Europeans. However, it remains to be seen how much of that will be implemented and how much is just talk. Let me make a broader assessment. It is a common mistake to think that it’s all about one person, one leader – Donald Trump. The truth is that the disengagement of America from Europe started long ago. Obviously, Trump is accelerating this, but he did not initiate it. Something good might come out of this, in the sense that the rhetoric is so extreme that Europeans at last cannot ignore the trend. It might be good to be in shock and to wake up after years of complacency. It is ridiculous that three years after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, we are still talking about a common European defence policy.
How will Trump’s tariffs affect the Greek economy, which in 2023 had 2.3bn dollars in exports to the US?
No one should want a trade war. It is an elementary lesson of basic economics that trade is beneficial for both sides, both the seller and the buyer. The trade relationship between Europe and America is one of the strongest in the world. It is the foundation of transatlantic strategic political cooperation. It would be a pity, and very costly, if this ceases to be the case. Having said that, it is also true that Greece will be less affected than other European countries, because of its smaller volume of exports.
However, there is an indirect consequence that we cannot underestimate. This has to do with the importance of shipping to the Greek economy. Any decline in world trade will have a notable negative impact.
Are you convinced that Putin really wants a lasting, viable peace deal that can ensure Ukraine’s sovereignty and security?
Not at all, and this is the big problem. It is one thing to have an armistice and quite another to have a lasting, durable peace. Let us remember that we already had 24 armistices since 2014, and none of them lasted. In order for the 25th to last, we must ensure respect for the freedom and sovereignty of Ukraine. But the Kremlin with its narratives continues to deny the very existence of a separate, free nation. We Greeks know very well [the Kremlin’s rejection of realities not to its liking] from the visceral reaction of the Moscow Patriarchate to the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s [October, 2018] decision to grant Autocephaly [independence, to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, previously under Moscow’s jurisdiction].
What should the EU’s role be, after spending huge amounts to defend Ukraine, in securing its sovereignty?
Trump is right in saying that this is mainly Europe’s problem. Since the end of WWII, the US has been the guarantor of European security, so it was involved. But that does not mean that Europeans should not take the initiative and understand that this is mainly their own problem.
For the first time ever, the traditional Atlanticists among our European friends – people from Britain, Scandinavia, the Baltic states or Poland, who focused almost exclusively on NATO and America – suddenly, after the election of Trump, have started talking about the need for Europe’s emancipation and geostrategic autonomy. They are coming to a new consensus that we Greeks together with a few others have always advocated. That is that Europe, because it has distinct interests, must also have a distinct geostrategic capability. If something positive is to come out of this calamity, it is this realisation. This offers Greece a very big opportunity to participate and take a leading role in shaping the new European security architecture, with Europe at the table rather than on the menu.
If the UK, France and other select EU countries send troops to countries neighbouring Ukraine to oversee implementation of a peace deal, do you think Greece could participate in that?
I see that Turkey is willing to do so, and thus we need to have a very serious discussion in Greece about the fact that this is a new age and we need an innovative, forward-looking, and much bolder strategy to cope with the risks and challenges of this new age.
So does that mean yes or no or maybe?
As long as our European partners understand the interconnections and linkages of security challenges in the East with those in the South, and as long as they take a holistic, comprehensive and consistent approach to foreign aggression, from wherever it comes, Greece should be willing to reciprocate.